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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
For many prisoners, federal habeas corpus stands as the last opportunity
to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences.' Simply
navigating through the procedural maze of habeas practice, however, is a
formidable task for inmates proceeding pro se and prisoners represented by
1. For truly exceptional cases, state habeas corpus may be available. See Butler v. State, 302
S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990). For a discussion of state habeas
corpus practiceand procedure, see JohnH. Blume, An Introduction to Post-ConvictionRemedies,
Practice and Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REV. 235, 262 (1994).
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counsel. 2 Tragically, those who have had a fundamentally unfair trial, and
even those who are innocent, may easily stumble.'
Since 1867, habeas corpus, or the Great Writ, has been available to state
prisoners "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States."4 The modem era of federal habeas corpus, however, did not begin
until the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen.5 In Brown, the Court
held that the violation of a constitutional right is cognizable in federal habeas
and that federal courts may independently review state court adjudications of
federal questions, even if the state court's treatment of those legal claims was
full and fair.6 Moreover, the Court recognized that a federal habeas court
must, under "unusual circumstances," hold a hearing to address questions of
fact. 7
The potential scope of habeas corpus is vast. At its root is the principle
that "if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental
requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate re-
lease. . . .Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office."8
However, despite the expansive tone of much of the language describing
habeas corpus, its effective reach has been curtailed, especially in recent
years.9 Motivated by concerns for the finality of convictions I° and federal-
2. One procedural obstacle should be stressed at the outset. Prisoners must present all of
their federal constitutional claims to the state court; that is, prisoners must "exhaust" available
state remedies. See discussion infra part III. Claims requiring factual development beyond the
trial record such as ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression of material exculpatory
evidence, or the knowing use of perjured testimony, must be presented in state post-conviction
proceedings. Familiarity with the post-convictionprocedures described in Blume, supra note 1,
is essential.
3. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
4. The Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. The Constitution
preserves the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
5. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (overruling Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)); see also
LARRY W. YACKLE, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 19-20 (1981) (discussing the history of
habeas corpus and the significance of Brown).
6. Brown, 344 U.S. at 458.
7. Id. at 463. The Court elaborated on the circumstances under which a federal court must
hold an evidentiary hearing in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and later in Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1717 (1992) (overruling Townsend on the issue of whether an
evidentiary hearing is required when a petitioner deliberately bypasses state procedures).
8. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); see also Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 132 (1866)
(Chase, C.J.) ("The laws which protect the liberties of the whole people must not be violated or
set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized though merited justice.").
9. Detailed discussion of the evolution in the Court's habeas jurisprudence over the last two
decades is beyond the scope of this article. For more information, see JAMES S. LIEBMAN &
RANDY HERTZ, HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1994); YACKLE, supra note
19961
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ism," the Court has erected "a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary,
and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights."" The
Court has even downplayed the role of habeas corpus itself. 3 Congress may
act to restrict habeas even further.' 4
To assist state inmates who confront the difficult task of a federal court
challenge to the legality of their detention, we first outline the elementary steps
in habeas corpus procedure,15 addressing basic concerns such as who may file
a petition, what must be included in the petition, the form of the petition, the
State's duty to file an answer, practice before a magistrate, and the logistics
of appealing an adverse decision. 6 Next, we outline the State's possible
defenses, including exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and
nonretroactivity, which may preclude a federal court from examining the
merits of a petition.'7 We then examine doctrines that affect the way a
federal court treats the merits of claims presented in the petition. In that
context we discuss when a federal court will defer to fact-finding of state
courts, when a federal court must hold an evidentiary hearing, and the
standard for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless.'
Finally, we address the special concerns of death-sentenced inmates who seek
a stay of execution pending consideration of their habeas petitions.19
5.
10. See Schnecklothv. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("No
effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing theoretical possibility that there is
error in every trial and that every incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law must
convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has
been imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting every imaginable
basis for further litigation but rather should look forward to rehabilitation and to becoming a
constructive citizen.").
11. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 748 ("'[F]ederal intrusions into state criminal
trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts
to honor constitutional rights.'") (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
12. Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I fear that the Court has lost its way in a procedural maze of
its own creation .. ").
13. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("The role of federal habeas
proceedings ... is secondary and limited.").
14. See Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995, H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(placing stricter limits on the time for filing and on the number of habeas appeals allowed).
15. This article provides only an overview of various doctrines. Several treatises provide a
thorough examination of relevant issues. In preparing this article and in litigating capital habeas
corpus cases, we have consulted the following: LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 9; YACKLE, supra
note 5; and IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS (1993).
16. See discussion infra part II.
17. See discussion infra part III.
18. See discussion infra part IV.
19. See discussion infra part V.
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While much of this article will discuss specific federal habeas corpus
doctrines, it is nevertheless important from the outset to touch on the challenge
of habeas advocacy. Habeas corpus is not like a direct appeal, in which one
presents the relevant facts and legal arguments in a well-written brief and
relies upon the merits of the issues to carry the day. A different mind-set is
required. Even though many grounds for relief will be entitled to de novo
review and plenary consideration, federal judges may be predisposed to deny
relief for a variety of reasons, including concerns about federalism and the
fimality of convictions. Therefore, the state court's resolution of constitutional
claims may be received in federal court with a practical, if not legal,
presumption of correctness.
A federal habeas corpus litigator must articulate, through the interdepen-
dence of the circumstances of the case and the legal grounds for relief,
coherent reasons why the writ must be granted. While an understanding of
complex habeas corpus principles is important, it is perhaps secondary to the
art of meaningful habeas corpus advocacy. The practitioner must convince the
court that the inmate is a human being, not a remorseless criminal; that the
inmate was denied a fundamentally fair trial and is not merely raising technical
issues; and finally, that the inmate, rather than refusing to accept responsibility
for misdeeds, did not receive basic justice in the state court.
II. BASIC HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE
A. Who May File a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
1. The Petitioner Must Be "In Custody"
The writ of habeas corpus does not extend to state prisoners unless they
are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."' This does not mean, however, that someone must be in
physical custody to petition for the writ. Other restraints on liberty, such as
parole or probation, place someone "in custody" within the meaning of the
habeas statute.21 A person is also considered in custody if he "may be
subject to such custody in the future."' Thus, a petitioner who is released
on his own recognizance pending the execution of a sentence is considered to
be in custody.' At the same time, one is not in custody if her sentence has
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
21. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
22. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DisTRicr COURTS
following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [hereinafter HABEAS RULES], Rule 2(b).
23. See Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300 (1984); Hensley v. Mun.
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
1996]
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fully expired at the time of the filing of the petition.24 If, however, an
inmate is serving consecutive sentences, and the first sentence would have
expired, he may nevertheless challenge the constitutionality of the first
conviction."z "[Custody for habeas purposes is defined not by any one
particular sentence but by the aggregate of the sentences. 26  Likewise, a
petitioner may attack a prior conviction used to enhance his punishment.27
2. The Prisoner Must Be Held in Violation of Federal Law
Besides being in custody, an inmate must allege an improper conviction
or sentence that is "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."28 Only a violation of a federal constitutional guarantee is
cognizable in federal habeas, with several exceptions. 29  In general, a
petitioner may not raise issues of state law unless the petitioner has been
deprived of a fundamentally fair trial.3" A federal habeas court "will not
question the evidentiary or procedural rulings of the state court unless [the
petitioner] can show that, because of the court's actions, his trial, as a whole,
was rendered fundamentally unfair. "31 On the other hand, state procedural
guidelines using "explicitly mandatory language" may create a protected
liberty interest.12  Consequently, arbitrary deprivations of such rights
guaranteed by state law may amount to a violation of due process.
33
24. See, e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (noting that collateral consequences
of an initial conviction, for which the sentence has expired, do not constitute "custody" for
habeas purposes).
25. Garlotte v. Fordice, 115 S. Ct. 1948 (1995).
26. Bernard v. Garraghty, 934 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54, 64 (1968) ("custody comprehends respondents' status for the entire duration of their
imprisonment.. . . for the aggregate of ... sentences").
27. Herbst v. Scott, 42 F.3d 902, 905 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2590 (1995); Brock
v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1994).
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1988).
29. See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975) (per curiam).
30. See Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991); Ashford v. Edwards, 780 F.2d 405, 407
(4th Cir. 1985); Barfield v. Harris, 719 F.2d 58, 61 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210
(1984).
31. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991); see
also Moran v. Godinez, 40 F.3d 1567, 1574 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that although a state post-
conviction court violated Nevada law by placing the burden of proving incompetency on the
inmate, this placement of the burden did not amount to a violation of a substantive federal right
because the state provided an adequate procedure to evaluate competency).
32. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983).
33. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (stating that due process is violated if a
defendant is arbitrarily denied a right guaranteed under state law); Harris ex. rel. Ramseyer v.
Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding the state court's failure to
conduct an adequate statutorily mandated proportionality review of petitioner's death sentence
6
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Although all claims must address violations of federal law, not all federal
claims are cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings. As a general rule, a
habeas petitioner cannot raise a suppression issue grounded in the Fourth
Amendment unless the state courts failed to provide him with a full and fair
opportunity to present his claim." The Supreme Court has declined to
extend the Stone v. Powell bar to other federal claims."
B. Basic Pleading and Filing Requirements in Habeas Proceedings
Federal habeas corpus is a civil proceeding governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts.36  Nevertheless, critical differences exist between
habeas cases and other civil actions.
1. Contents of the Petition
Unlike other types of civil actions, habeas cases require fact pleading as
opposed to notice pleading.37 This, however, does not mean that petitioners
must enumerate all facts and legal theories that support their claims. Instead,
petitioners must specify grounds for relief and set forth in summary fashion
the facts supporting each ground for relief.38 Indeed, many facts will not
become apparent until after the court has authorized discovery 39 and held an
evidentiary hearing.' The petition must allege federal constitutional
violations, and a petitioner should be careful to plead the entire constitutional
violated due process), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).
34. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
382-83 (1986) (holding that the petitioner can raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
in habeas corpus for counsel's failure to raise a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim).
35. See Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (declining to extend Stone to claims
based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-22
(1979) (rejecting the extension of Stone to claims of insufficiency of the evidence); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (declining to extend Stone to claims of racial discrimination in the
selection of grand jurors).
36. See HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 11. Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with habeas corpus rules. Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63 (1977).
37. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (denying hearing because petitioner failed
to allege that counsel's ineffectivenessprejudiced him). Compare HABEAS RULES, supra note 22,
Rule 4 (requiring petition to show entitlement to relief) with FED. R. Crv. P. 8 (requiring a short
and plain statement that petitioner is entitled to relief.
38. Jones v. Jerrison, 20 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 75
n.7 (requiring that petition simply "state facts that point to a 'real possibility of [c]onstitutional
error'").
39. See HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6.
40. See HABEAS RULEs, supra note 22, Rule 8.
1996]
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violation. Also, the claims in the petition must first have been presented to the
state courts.4 The petition may be amended, as of right, prior to the filing
of a responsive pleading. 42 Thereafter, amendment is permitted by leave of
court, which is to be "freely given when justice so requires."
43
2. Form of the Petition
The petition must be "in substantially the form annexed to [the] rules.""
The petitioner must supply the procedural history of the case, the grounds
raised in state court, the grounds for relief in the federal petition, and the
names of counsel who represented the petitioner in state court. The state
officer having custody of the petitioner, for example, the warden of the prison
or the commissioner of the Department of Corrections, should be named as the
respondent.
45
3. Logistics of Filing the Petition
Because only one federal district exists in South Carolina, a petition may
be filed in any of the federal courts or divisions in the state. Local Fourth
Circuit Rules require that a statement be fied with the clerk of the court of
appeals whenever a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed involving a
death-sentenced inmate. 46  The statement, which is in the Rules, requests
certain procedural information regarding the history of the case. If the
petitioner is indigent, a motion to proceed informa pauperis must be filed with
the affidavit of indigency, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915.47
4. Counsel and Expert Services
Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, a district court may appoint
counsel in proceedings pursuant to section 2254.48 "Whenever the United
States magistrate or the court determines that the interests of justice so require,
41. See discussion infra part III.A.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
44. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 2(c). Blank petitions are available without charge
from the clerk of the district court. Id.
45. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 2(a). On the other hand, if a petitioner is subject
to future custody, "the officer having present custody of the applicant and the attorney general
of the state in which the judgment which he seeks to attack was entered shall each be named as
respondents." HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 2(b).
46. 4TH Cm. R. 22(b).
47. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 3(a).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (1994).
[Vol. 47:271
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representation may be provided for any financially eligible person who.., is
seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28. " 41 If an
evidentiary hearing is required,50 the court must appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner.51
In addition to providing for the appointment of paid counsel, the Criminal
Justice Act allows a federal court to provide experts and investigators to
indigent inmates seeking relief pursuant to section 2254.52 Although no
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in section 2254 proceedings existed
prior to the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, Congress chose to extend needed
assistance to habeas applicants because such proceedings "frequently raise[]
serious and complex issues of law and fact.""
With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, 54
Congress provided that death-sentenced inmates challenging their convictions
and sentences pursuant to section 2254 are entitled to appointed counsel. 5
In this act, Congress also lifted, almost word-for-word, the provision of the
Criminal Justice Act providing for experts and investigators.56 Counsel may
request, ex parte, funds for investigative, expert, or other services that are
"reasonably necessary" for the proper presentation of issues relating to guilt
or sentence.57 The funds may be approved nunc pro tunc.5s In addition,
Congress decided that district courts could reimburse counsel and experts for
death-sentenced inmates at rates above those set forth in the Criminal Justice
Act.59
5. Preliminary Judicial Consideration
Once a petition is filed, the case is assigned to a district judge.' The
49. Id.
50. See discussion infra part IV.B.
51. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8(c).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1994).
53. H.R. Rep. No. 1546,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982,
3993.
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-978 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added). To effectuate the intent of Congress,
the Court has held that district courts have the authority to enter a stay of execution and appoint
counsel even before a death-sentenced inmate files a habeas petition. McFarland v. Scott, 114
S. Ct. 2568, 2573 (1994).
56. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1994) with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1994).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1994).
58. Id.
59. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) (1994); see also In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233 (1991) (per
curiam) (setting the maximum compensation amount).
60. In the District of South Carolina, capital cases are assigned on a rotating basis. The
number and letters at the end of the civil action number will indicate the judge and magistrate,
1996]
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respondent must file an answer unless the district court determines from "the
face of the petition" that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.61 A habeas
petition cannot be summarily dismissed unless the allegations are "palpably
incredible . . . patently frivolous or false."62 Otherwise, a petitioner is
entitled to "careful consideration and plenary processing" of claims, including
the "full opportunity for presentation of the relevant facts." 63 While the
petitioner may not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he may supplement
the record by resorting to civil discovery64 and expansion of the record.'
One caveat is in order: a petitioner is not entitled to discovery unless "the
judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave
to do so, but not otherwise."'
6. Respondent's Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment
The Attorney General will almost invariably file a motion for summary
judgment with the State's answer. The court may treat the State's failure to
dispute the factual allegations in the petition as an admission.67 Although the
petition can set forth in detail the legal and factual bases supporting the
grounds for relief, in many cases a petitioner's lengthy pleading, or brief in
support of the petition, is filed in response to the Attorney General's motion
for summary judgment. 68  The State is not entitled to summary judgment
unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact ... "69 The court must construe the factual record
respectively, to whom the case has been assigned.
61. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 4.
62. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487, 495 (1962) and Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 119 (1956)).
63. Id. at 82-83 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969)).
64. See HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6.
65. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 7; see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
Expanded material may include letters, documents, exhibits, transcripts, answers under oath, and
affidavits. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 7(b).
66. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6; see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297
(1969) (concluding that extending a broad discovery right to habeas proceedings "would do
violence to the efficient and effective administration of the Great Writ").
67. Bland v. CaliforniaDep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 357 (1994); HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 5 ("The answer shall respond to the
allegations of the petition.").
68. This is also the time that a motion for an evidentiary hearing with a supporting
memorandum is generally filed. See D.S.C. R. 12.04.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1172 (1992).
[Vol. 47:271
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in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.7" This is the standard
applicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings. 7
Summary judgment procedure in habeas cases, however, differs from
other types of civil actions. For example, contrary to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the district court need not give a petitioner ten days notice
that it intends to rule on the basis of the state court record.72
7. Magistrate Practice
In South Carolina most district judges refer habeas cases to their
magistrates. The magistrate will initially handle the case and issue a report and
recommendation. An evidentiary hearing, if held, will also usually be
conducted before the magistrate.73 Both the petitioner and the attorney
general may file objections to the report and recommendation within ten days
of being served with a copy.74 The district court judge "shall [then] make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made."' However, the
district court can still order an evidentiary hearing or otherwise permit the
record to be expanded.
To preserve the possibility of appeal, a petitioner must object to
unfavorable portions of the magistrate's report and recommendation.76 The
failure to file timely and proper objections within ten days to the magistrate's
fact-fimding or legal conclusions may result in a waiver of a petitioner's
otherwise unqualified right to seek de novo review on appeal.77
8. Appeals
A timely notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the district
court's entry of judgment.7" This requirement is mandatory and jurisdic-
70. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347 (1976); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.
654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).
71. See, e.g., Myers v. Collins, 8 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1993).
72. See McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 970 (11th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
489 (1994).
73. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8(b)(1).
74. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8(b)(3).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8(b)(4).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8(b)(3). These
requirements apply to the attorney general as well as the petitioner.
77. See Carr v. Hutto, 737 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). But see Kelly v. Withrow,
25 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the failure to file specific objections to the
magistrate's report and recommendation is not jurisdictional and the failure to do so may be
excused in the interests of justice).
78. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1).
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tional, 79 and the court of appeals may not grant an extension."0 On the
other hand, the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, may extend the time to file the notice of appeal by no more than thirty
days so long as a motion for extension has been filed within the thirty-day
period."1 A motion to alter or amend the district court's judgment, however,
tolls the time for filing the notice of appeal. I
a. Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal
In order to appeal a district court's denial of habeas relief, an inmate must
seek and obtain a certificate of probable cause from the district court or the
court of appeals stating that a reasonable ground for appeal is present.8 3 The
Fourth Circuit requires that an application for a certificate of probable cause
be accompanied by a memorandum or informal brief. 4 If a petitioner does
not file an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal in the court
of appeals after the district court denies the certificate, the appellate court will
treat the notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of probable cause.85
To obtain a certificate of probable cause, a petitioner must make a "substantial
showing of the denial of [a] federal right," 6 which requires a demonstration
"that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
resolve the issues . . . [in a different manner]; or that the questions are
'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"7
b. Other Appellate Concerns
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Local Rule 22, and the Fourth
Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures also address issues relating to appeals
of capital habeas corpus proceedings. Pursuant to internal operating
79. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam).
80. FED. R. APP. P. 26(b).
81. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5); see also Martinez v. Hoke, 38 F.3d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (finding that a district court may, upon a showing of excusable neglect, extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal for up to thirty days).
82. See FED. R. APP. P. 59(e); see also Griggs, 459 U.S. at 60-61 (per curiam) (holding that
a notice of appeal is invalid if filed prior to disposition on a motion to alter or amend). Courts
use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing denial of FED. R. CIv. P. 59(e) motions.
Boryan v. United States, 884 F.2d 767, 771 (4th Cir. 1989).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1988); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
84. 4TH CiR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. 22.1.
85. Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 237, 239 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994).
86. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v.
Beto, 454 F.2d 263, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972)).
87. Gordon v. Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 913 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (quoting United States ex rel.
Jones v. Richmond, 245 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1957)).
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procedures, at least one member of the review panel will be from the state
where the petitioner's conviction arose.88  The Fourth Circuit has a death
penalty coordinator whose job is to monitor capital cases as they proceed
through the federal courts. Finally, as in other cases, the district court's legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo, but its factual findings are reviewed
pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard. 9
III. THE STATE'S DEFENSE
In the State's answer or memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment, the State must inform the court whether the petitioner has
sufficiently presented all federal constitutional claims in state court.90 At this
stage, the State may raise various procedural defenses designed to preclude the
court from reaching the merits of the claims.
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies
1. The Basic Doctrine
A habeas petitioner must exhaust available state remedies before a federal
court will review the constitutional claims.9 The purpose of the exhaustion
requirement is "to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal
law and [to] prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. "9 Courts
generally consider remedies exhausted when claims have been "fairly present-
ed" one time to the highest state court.93 For example, if a claim was raised
on direct appeal, it does not have to be raised again in the state post-conviction
proceedings.' The Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion requirement
88. 4TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. 22.2.
89. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
90. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22, Rule 5.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). In capital cases tried in South Carolina prior to State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), the defendant was not required to present all
possible grounds for relief to the state supreme court because capital cases were reviewed in
favorem vitae, under which all record-based claims "are assumed to have been reviewed."
Draytonv. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8,430 S.E.2d 517, 519, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993). The
state court's treatment of record-based claims on direct appeal effectively satisfied the exhaustion
requirement. The effect of Torrence in the procedural default context is discussed infra part
III.B.1.
92. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
93. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
94. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam); Myers v. Collins,
919 F.2d 1074, 1075-77 (5th Cir. 1990). On the other hand, the exhaustion requirement is not
satisfied if a petitioner raises a claim for the first and only time in a petition for discretionary
review to a state appellate court. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).
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is satisfied even if the state tribunal does not fully consider the claim, so long
as the state court had a fair opportunity to do so by being reasonably informed
of the nature of the claim.9' Generally, the state courts must be given the
relevant facts and controlling legal principles and must be apprised that the
claim rests, in whole or in part, on the federal constitution." A petitioner
may satisfy this requirement by citing a specific federal constitutional
provision, alerting the state court to the federal nature of the claim through the
substance of the claim, relying on federal constitutional precedents, or
asserting a state claim that is "functionally identical" to a federal claim.'
However, a petitioner need not cite "book and verse on the federal constitu-
tion""s if the nature of the claim is evident. Generally, however, state courts
"must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under
the United States Constitution."" At the same time, the submission of
additional evidence in the district court that does not fundamentally alter the
legal claim already considered by the state courts does not mean the claim is
not exhausted."tu The claim may be deemed unexhausted, however, if the
new evidence places the claim in a significantly different posture than it was
when the state courts considered it.101
Furthermore, a habeas petitioner may not need to exhaust claims if "there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or ... circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."32
95. See Blume, supra note 1, at 250-51 (discussing how to plead a claim in state post-
conviction proceedings in a manner satisfying the exhaustion requirement).
96. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 10 (1982) (per curiam); Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-
76. The petitioner must "alert fairly" the state court of the federal nature of the claim and permit
it to "adjudicate squarely" the federal issue. Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir.
1992).
97. Scarpa v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 940 (1995).
98. Picard, 404 U.S. at 278 (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.
1958)); see also Renzi v. Virginia, 794 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that a claim
alleging denial of due process accompanied by supporting federal authority was fairly presented).
99. Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (per curiam) (finding unexhausted a claim
raised under California law but not under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause). If,
on the other hand, the state court would not have viewed the claim differently had the word
"federal" appeared in the heading, the claim is exhausted for purposes of habeas review. See
Beauchamp v. Murphy, 37 F.3d 700, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1365
(1995).
100. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); see also Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459,
1468-69 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a new factual allegation that an interpreterhad intentionally
misadvised petitioner did not fundamentally alter the claim that petitioner was induced to plead
guilty by grossly incorrect advice).
101. E.g., Wise v. Warden, 839 F.2d 1030, 1033 (4th Cir. 1988).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988); see also Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per
curiam) ("An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state
court . . ."). Occasionally, due to significant delays in the state court system, a federal habeas
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In addition, a petitioner has only to exhaust state remedies which existed at the
time the federal petition was filed. A federal court has the discretion,
however, to require a petitioner to resort to new postconviction remedies. 03
Intervening legal decisions do not generally require a petitioner to return to the
state courts to "re-exhaust" the issue."°  In sum, because exhaustion is a
rule of comity and not of jurisdiction, it is to be applied flexibly.15
2. Mixed Petitions
A habeas petition that contains unexhausted issues may be dismissed. 06
Even if a petition is "mixed," containing exhausted and unexhausted claims,
a federal court may dismiss the petition entirely."w The dismissal for failure
to exhaust, however, is without prejudice.108
3. The State's Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement
The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.0 9 Thus, a respondent
in a federal habeas corpus action is permitted to waive exhaustion.1 The
State must indicate in its answer to the petition whether the petitioner has
exhausted available state remedies.' But if the State fails, either intentional-
ly or inadvertently, to raise an exhaustion defense, the district court may
address the merits of the claims. Nevertheless, the district court does not have
to accept the waiver."'
court will dispense with the exhaustion requirement and address the merits of the claims raised
in the petition. See, e.g., Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
593 (1994); Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992); Elcock v. Henderson, 902
F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
103. See James v. Copinger, 428 F.2d 235, 242 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 959
(1971).
104. See Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974) (per curiam).
105. E.g., Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168, 1170 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
106. See Richardson v. Turner, 716 F.2d 1059, 1062 (4th Cir. 1983).
107. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982).
108. Id. at 510.
109. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
110. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 132-35 (1987); Esslingerv. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515,
1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
111. HABEAS RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 5; see also United States ex rel. Johnson v. Gilmore,
860 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that the State waived the nonexhaustion
defense by failing to raise it properly in its answer).
112. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134-35.
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B. Procedural Default
1. The Basic Rule
The United States Supreme Court has held that federal habeas courts must
honor legitimate state trial and appellate procedural rules."' The rule is
rooted in the independent and adequate state ground doctrine'14 and in
concerns of comity and federalism."' For a federal court to be forced to
honor a state procedural default, the last state court decision must have clearly
expressed that it was barring review of a federal constitutional claim by
reliance on a state procedural rule." 6  Furthermore, a federal court must
presume that a state court's dismissal of a constitutional claim does not rest on
independent and adequate state grounds and that the court has rejected the
claims on the merits." 7
The most common examples of procedural default are the failure to lodge
a contemporaneous objection at trial,"' the failure to raise a claim on direct
appeal," '9 the failure to raise a claim in a petition for discretionary review
by a state appellate court, 20 and the failure to file a discretionary appeal in
state court.' In South Carolina, however, the failure to lodge a proper
objection at trial is not a default in capital cases tried prior to State v.
Torrence."Z Prior to Torrence, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed
capital cases infavorem vitae, or "in favor of life." The effect of infavorem
vitae is that all record-based claims "are assumed to have been reviewed" by
the South Carolina Supreme Court on direct appeal; thus, the claims are
exhausted and not defaulted.'3 Because the state supreme court does not
113. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
114. Under this doctrine, a federal court will not review a decision of a state court if the state
court's ruling rests on a state law ground which is independent of the federal question and is an
"adequate" basis of the state court decision. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989).
115. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
116. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. Federal courts are to presume that "[w]here there has been one
reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that
judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797, 803 (1991).
117. Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289
(1993).
118. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 72.
119. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam).
120. See Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
121. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722.
122. 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); see also Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 430 S.E.2d
517 (declining to extend in favorem vitae review to collateral proceedings brought prior to
Torrence), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993).
123. See Drayton, 312 S.C. at 8-9, 430 S.E.2d at 519.
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review the postconviction record in capital cases in favorem vitae, all issues
in the application for postconviction relief must be appealed or they will be
deemed waived.124 Nonrecord-based claims also may be deemed defaulted
if they are raised in a federal habeas petition for the first time. 125
2. Avoiding the State's Attempt to Assert a Procedural Bar
a. Failure to Satisfy the
"Adequate and Independent State Law" Doctrine
In responding to the State's assertion of a procedural default, a habeas
petitioner must first consider whether the claim had been adequately presented
to the state court or whether the state court ruled on the merits of the
claim." Next, a petitioner must determine whether the State satisfies the
"adequate and independent state law" doctrine. If, for example, the state
procedural rule is intertwined with federal law, it is not independent of federal
law. Accordingly, the state's default rule cannot preclude a federal court from
entertaining the claim. 1
27
Furthermore, a federal court may honor state procedural rules only if
those rules are "adequate." A rule is adequate when it is firmly estab-
lished" and consistently applied. 29 When a state court ignores the default
124. See Whitley, 802 F.2d at 1500.
125. See Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2966
(1993), reh'g granted and case remanded on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1365 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1489 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (addressing merits
sua sponte despite available procedural default); Abdullah v. Groose, 44 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 1995)
(reviewing a claim that petitioner was tried while shackled pursuant to the state's plain-error
rule); Hall v. Delo, 41 F.3d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding ineffectiveness claim fairly
presented in motion to recall the mandate); Johnson v. Cowley, 40 F.3d 341, 344 (10th Cir.
1994) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel claim properly raised, even though claim could
have been "better stated").
127. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d 876, 880 (5th
Cir. 1994) (finding that state court decision was "interwoven with federal law, and did not
express clearly that its decisionwas based on state procedural grounds"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1964 (1995); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994).
128. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991); Forgy v. Norris, 64 F.3d 399, 401-02
(8th Cir. 1995); Easter v. Endell, 37 F.3d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding a rule setting time
limit for filing state postconviction petition not firmly established); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't
of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1381 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (rejecting asserted procedural bar
because petitioner's case in state court raised a question that state courts had not specifically
addressed before), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1404 (1995); Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 23 F.3d 756,
764 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding no procedural default for failing to raise objection to evidentiary
ruling because, at the time, state law permitted error to be reviewed in postconviction
proceedings), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 778 (1995); Hansbrough v. Latta, 11 F.3d 143 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994).
129. See Johnsonv. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341,348-
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and decides the merits of a claim, a federal court may also review the
merits.130 The procedural default defense may also be waived if the State
does not assert it in a timely manner.' Other exceptions exist as well.,32
b. Cause and Prejudice
Even if the state procedural default rests on adequate and independent
state law grounds, federal courts may nevertheless reach the merits of a federal
claim if a petitioner can show cause and prejudice.'33
i. Cause for Defaulting a Claim
The Supreme Court has declined "to essay a comprehensive catalog of the
circumstances that would justify a finding of cause. ""' Generally speaking,
courts have found cause for a procedural default where there existed an
objective external impediment that could have prevented the claim from being
49 (1984) (holding that only state procedures that are "firmly established and regularly followed
... can prevent implementation of federal constitutional rights"); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146, 149 (1964) ("[Sltate procedural requirements which are not strictly or regularly
followed cannot deprive us of the right to review."); Lowe v. Scott, 48 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir.
1995); Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 1995); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634
(7th Cir. 1994) (finding that Illinois courts do not uniformly bar Batson claims where defendant
has failed to make a record of racial composition); Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1318
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a rule against successive state habeas petitions was not consistently
applied until after state had denied petitioner's application), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995);
Smith v. Black, 970 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that procedural bars that are not
"strictly or regularly followed" will not function as an adequate and independent state ground
supporting a judgment).
130. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483,
1488-89 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 892, 895 (4th Cir. 1990); Mann v.
Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1448 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); Oliver
v. Wainwright, 795 F.2d 1524, 1528-29 (lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 921 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Odum v. Boone, 62 F.3d 327, 329-30 (10th Cir. 1995) (refusing to raise a state
procedural bar defensesua sponte); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1545 (1lth Cir. 1994) (finding
that the State waived the procedural default defense by failing to assert it in district court and on
appeal); Lawrence v. Arnontrout, 31 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that default defense
was waived because the State did not present it in district court), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1124
(1995); Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1128 (1995). But
see Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1524-25 (1 th Cir. 1995) (holding that a federal court may
raise sua sponte a procedural bar to relief that the State has waived if an important federal interest
is served).
132. A discussion of procedural default and the legal grounds for challengingits invocation can
be found in LIEBMAN & HERTz, supra note 9.
133. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
134. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1986) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13
(1984)).
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raised. For example, state action that makes compliance with the state's
procedural rule impracticable is cause.' 35 Courts have additionally held that
where the factual or legal basis for a novel claim was not reasonably available
to counsel, cause may exist for a procedural default.136 Furthermore, federal
courts have consistently recognized that constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel is cause that will excuse a procedural default.'37 Still, the
ineffective assistance claim serving as cause must have been exhausted in state
court before it can be presented in a federal habeas proceeding. 131
ii. Prejudice for a Defaulted Claim
The Supreme Court has made it clear that a petitioner must show actual
prejudice resulting from a constitutional violation in order to establish the
prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test.139 A petitioner who proce-
duraly defaults "must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the
errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his
actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions.4""' It is important to establish that a constitutional
violation needs to be corrected when addressing the prejudice prong of the
procedural default analysis in Wainwright v. Sykes.
c. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice
A federal court can review a state procedural default, absent a showing
of cause and prejudice, if failing to do so would result in a fundamental
135. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 215 (1988) (affirming that a secret
prosecutorial memorandum discovered after trial constituted cause for failure to raise jury
challenge).
136. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). But cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding
that new rules of law are not given retroactive effect unless one of two exceptions is found to
exist). The retroactivity doctrine is discussed in more detail infra part III.C.
137. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582,
586 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[C]onstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel is cause per se in
the procedural default context.. ."); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 973 (4th Cir. 1994) (en
bane) (recognizing that counsel's ineffectiveness may excuse procedural default); United States
v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that counsel's failure to bring a
claim to court's attention constituted ineffectiveassistance); Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is cause for failure to raise Fifth
Amendment claim); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 1535, 1559-60 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel provided cause for failure to charge on lesser included offense).
But see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991) (finding that ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel is not cause because there is no right to counsel in postconviction).
138. See Justus v. Murray, 897 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1990).
139. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
140. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
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miscarriage of justice.' 4' The most notable fundamental miscarriage of
justice is where "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent. "142 To satisfy this standard "the
petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."143
In Schiup v. Delo'4 an inmate accused of killing another inmate in
prison submitted a second habeas petition, which presented for the first time
affidavits and a videotape establishing his alibi. 45 The Court emphasized
that the petitioner was not arguing that he was entitled to relief because he was
innocent or that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of one who is
innocent. Rather, the petitioner properly made a colorable showing of
innocence to excuse his prior failure to litigate claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel and the failure of the state to disclose material exculpatory
information. 
46
Regarding the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception for death
sentences, the Court has acknowledged the difficulty in translating the concept
of "actual innocence" from the guilt phase to the sentencing phase of a capital
trial.147  However, in Sawyer v. Whitley,'" the Court held that the stan-
dard for-actual innocence as it pertains to sentencing phase error, is that "but
for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law. " 149 The Court
noted that actual innocence "must focus on those elements which render a
defendant eligible for the death penalty" under state law.5 0 Thus, pursuant
to the Court's analysis, the statutory aggravating factors which determine death
penalty eligibility must be undermined, or the petitioner must demonstrate
facts which categorically bar the imposition of the death penalty.
141. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
142. Id.
143. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 454-55 n.17 (1986) (requiring the prisoner to "show a fair probability that, in light of all
the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have
become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable
doubt of his guilt") (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976)).
144. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
145. Id. at 858.
146. Id. at 860 (distinguishing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (raising innocence
as "a novel substantive claim")).
147. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.
527, 537 (1986).
148. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
149. Id. at 2517.
150. Id. at 2523.
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To validate "reasonable good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions,"151 the Court has held that, with two exceptions, "new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced. " 152 In Teague v.
Lane,53 a non-capital case, the petitioner sought a ruling that the Sixth, in
addition to the Fourteenth, Amendment applied to the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges. The Teague Court declined to reach the merits of
petitioner's argument. Instead, the Court held that it first must consider
whether the petitioner, then in federal habeas corpus litigation, could even gain
the benefit of a favorable ruling. Stated differently, the Court had to decide
whether a ruling on the merits could be applied retroactively to the petitioner's
case. 154
Drawing on analysis suggested by Justice Harlan, 55 the Court deter-
mined that only those defendants whose cases are pending on direct review
when a new rule of law is announced can rely on that rule to attack their
convictions. Under Teague, therefore, the retroactivity of a petitioner's request
for relief is now a threshold issue in federal habeas corpus proceedings. As
such, retroactivity should be addressed before the merits of the claim are
decided.' 56 As with other nonjurisdictional procedural defenses, the state
may waive retroactivity if it is not timely and properly raised as a defense.
57
151. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
152. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989) (applying Teague's retroactivity analysis to capital cases).
153. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
154. Id. at 300. The Court has held that Teague is a one-way street, so to speak. The State
sometimes receives the benefit of new rules, while a habeas petitioner does not. See Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993).
155. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (finding that a federal court's task is to
"determine whether a state court considering [the petitioner's constitutional] claim at the time his
convictionbecame final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule
[sought] was required by the Constitution").
157. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994) (holding that because nonretroactivity
is not jurisdictional, a federal court may choose not to apply Teague if the State does not raise
it); Sinastaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 805 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448,
456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510 (1992).
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2. The Three-Step Retroactivity Analysis
In Caspari v. Bohlen58 the Court articulated a three-step analysis.
First, the court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's conviction
and sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, the court should
survey the legal landscape as it then existed in order to determine if a state
court considering the defendant's claim at the time the conviction became final
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to grant relief. The issue at
this step is whether the petitioner is seeking the benefit of a new rule. Third,
even if the court determines that the defendant seeks to benefit from a new
rule, the court must decide whether the two exceptions to nonretroactivity
apply. 1
59
a. Determining When a Case Becomes Final
A case is final for the purposes of retroactivity analysis when certiorari
is denied by the United States Supreme Court following the initial direct
appeal. If a defendant does not file a certiorari petition, the case is final when
the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed.W
b. What Constitutes a New Rule
"[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes
a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 6 '
In Butler v. McKellar62 the Court expanded the scope of the new rule
doctrine. Pursuant to Butler, a case establishes a new rule if its outcome was
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."163 The new rule principle
"validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made
by state courts" even though they are later shown to be erroneous./64
In Stringer v. Black"6 the Court limited the effect of Butler by indicat-
ing that the application of new facts to established constitutional principles
does not trigger the retroactivity bar." Specifically, the Stringer Court
158. 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994).
159. Id. at 953.
160. Id.; Powell v. Nevada, 114 S. Ct. 1280 (1994); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987).
161. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
162. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
163. Id. at 415.
164. Id. at 414.
165. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
166. Id.; see also Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 n.3 (1988); Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d
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considered the retroactivity of Maynard v. Cartwright,67 where the Court
had found that Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravat-
ing circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. 6 ' The petitioner in Stringer
argued that Maynard was not new because it was dictated by the Court's
holding in Godfrey v. Georgia.69 In Godfrey the Court found unconstitu-
tionally vague the aggravating circumstance that the murder "was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim."170 Both Godfrey and Maynard
were based on the Eighth Amendment mandate that capital sentencing
provisions limit and channel the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death
penalty to minimize "the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 7 '
Although the unconstitutionally vague language in Godfrey differed from
the language in Maynard, both sets of aggravating circumstances violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against the arbitrary infliction of capital
punishment. Despite differences in wording, both decisions stemmed from the
same constitutional provision. Because the Supreme Court found no new
burden on the states, the result in Maynard was dictated by Godfrey. '72 The
Court noted that "it would be a mistake to conclude that the vagueness ruling
of Godfrey was limited to the precise language before us in that case."
17
Recent cases have waxed and waned on the strictness of the application of
dictated-by-precedent rule.' 74 However, the courts have made clear that
certain Supreme Court decisions, such as the Court's ruling in Strickland v.
Washington,75 which established the standard for assessing whether a
criminal defendant's representation was effective, have set forth broad
872, 884 (4th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between a new rule, which seeks the extension of an
existing rule, and "the mere application" of an normative rule to a new set of facts). The
Supreme Court has stated that the existing rule must be fairly specific; otherwise, the practical
effect "would be meaningless if applied at this level of generality." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227, 236 (1990).
167. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
168. Id. at 359-60.
169. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
170. Id. at 422.
171. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362; see Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
172. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229.
173. Id. at 228-29; see also Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
petitioner sought only to apply Godfrey to a different factual setting rather than to benefit from
a new rule).
174. For an indication of how the Court has dealt with the retroactivity question, see Caspari
v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1994); Sawyer v. Smith,
497 U.S. 227 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
175. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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normative rules designed to be applied to different factual circumstances. 7 6
Thus claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will not implicate Teague's
retroactivity principles.
c. Exceptions to the Retroactivity Doctrine
In Teague the Court announced that new rules would be applied
retroactively if they fell into one of two narrow categories. A new rule falls
within the first exception if it places certain kinds of primary private individual
conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe, or if it addresses a
substantive categorical guarantee accorded by the Constitution. An example
of this exception is a rule that "prohibits imposing the death penalty on a
certain class of defendants because of their status or. . .offense.'"177
The second exception is for "'watershed rules of criminal procedure' that
are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding. "178 "A
rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but
also 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to
the fairness of a proceeding. "1
79
D. Subsequent Petitions
Due to concerns about the finality of convictions and federalism, federal
courts may decide not to reach the merits of constitutional claims under the
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine if a prisoner raises a claim that was already raised
in a previous habeas petition' s or if a prisoner raises a claim in a subsequent
petition that he could have raised in an earlier petition.'' In McCleskey v.
Zant'" the Court established the following principles for successive peti-
tions.
176. Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995).
177. Penry, 492 U.S. at 329-30 (citations omitted).
178. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-13 (1989)).
179. Id. at 242 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311); see also Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th
Cir. 1994) (finding that the rule announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), regarding
defective reasonable doubt instruction, fell within the second Teague exception); Williams v.
Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the rule established in McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), fell within the second Teague exception).
180. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); see also HABEAS RULES, supra note 22,
Rule 9(b) (providing that a second or successive petition may be dismissed if the petitioner fails
to allege new or different grounds and the prior determination was on the merits).
181. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); see also HABEAS RULES, supra note 22,
Rule 9(b) (providing that a second or successive petition may be dismissed despite new and
different grounds if the judge finds that the failure to assert the grounds in a prior petition
"constituted an abuse of the writ").
182. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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1. Initial Pleading Burden
When a prisoner files a second or subsequent petition, the government
bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ. The government satisfies this
burden if it clearly and specifically notes the petitioner's writ history, identifies
the claim that appears for the first time, and alleges that the petitioner has
abused the writ."8 3 Like other procedural defenses, the State may waive the
abuse issue by failing to raise it in the district court."s4
2. Petitioner's Burden
The burden then shifts to the petitioner to disprove abuse and to excuse
his failure to raise the claim earlier. In McCleskey the Court adopted the
cause and prejudice test of Wainwright v. Sykes.'85 To avoid application of
the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, the petitioner must show cause and prejudice
as those concepts have been defined in the Court's procedural default
decisions.18 6 A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding
abuse of the writ unless the district court determines as a matter of law that the
petitioner cannot satisfy the standard.'"
As in other contexts, if a petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise
the claim earlier may still be excused if the petitioner can show that a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" would result from a failure to entertain
the claim.' 8 In other words, a petitioner must supplement his petition with
a colorable showing of factual innocence or with a showing that he is innocent
of the death penalty."8 9
IV. DECIDING THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
Even if a federal court concludes that no procedural defense precludes it
from addressing the merits of particular constitutional claims, a habeas
183. Id. at 494.
184. See, e.g., Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991); Aldridge v. Dugger,
925 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
186. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494.
187. Id. For a more detailed discussion of when a federal court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing, see infra part IV.B.
188. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95.
189. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (discussing necessary showing of innocence
at the guilt phase); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520-23 (1992) (discussing what
petitioner must show to argue that he is "actually innocent" of the death penalty). For a




Blume and Voisin: An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1996
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
petitioner must navigate through additional doctrinal obstacles before achieving
a favorable result. The first obstacle is that factual determinations of state
courts are afforded a presumption of correctness. 10 Second, with respect
to claims requiring factual development, a petitioner must either show
entitlement to an evidentiary hearing or convince the court to exercise its
discretion and convene a hearing.' 9 ' Finally, even if a petitioner convinces
the court that constitutional rights were violated, the court must assess the
harmfulness of the error.
A. Presumption of Correctness Afforded to State Court
Findings of Fact
1. Distinguishing Questions of Fact from
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
A federal court should ordinarily presume that factual determinations
made by state courts are correct if (1) there has been a hearing on the merits
of a factual issue; (2) in a state court of competent jurisdiction; (3) where the
applicant and the State were parties; and (4) which is evidenced by a written
finding or opinion. '" The presumption in section 2254(d) also applies to
findings of fact made by a state appellate court.' 13
The deference to the state courts reaches only to findings of "basic,
primary, or historical facts," not to determinations of law or to mixed
questions of law and fact. " Findings relating to questions of law or to
mixed questions of law and fact are not presumed to be correct. 195 Howev-
er, as the Supreme Court has noted, the "appropriate methodology for distin-
guishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least,
elusive." 196 The Supreme Court has yet to arrive at a "rule or principle that
will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion. " "
Thus, it is important to know how and why the Court distinguishes which
questions are factual and which are legal. In its most recent treatment of these
questions, the Supreme Court concluded that the determination of whether a
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
191. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds by
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
193. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981).
194. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 n.6; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,698 (1984).
195. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1029-30 (4th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 224 (1995); Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1219 (4th Cir.
1986).
196. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).
197. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
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suspect was "in custody" for Miranda purposes was a mixed question of law
and fact warranting independent federal review. 9' The Court discussed the
reason for its previous decisions as being grounded in the circumstances in
which the decision is made. For example, if an issue involves the credibility
or demeanor of a witness and the facts are developed in open court on a full
record, the state court is in a better position to make the requisite findings.
Thus, the issue is treated as a question of fact."9 If, on the other hand, the
legal standard is complex and observation of the state court proceeding will
not assist in resolving the issue, a federal court should consider the issue to be
a mixed question of law and fact and address it de novo. ° Because the
determination of whether a defendant was "in custody" involves the resolution
of whether a "reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation" and because the trial court does not have a first-
person vantage on whether a defendant was "in custody," application of the
controlling legal standard to the historical facts in this "ultimate determination
. . .presents a 'mixed question of law and fact' qualifying for independent
review."1 °1 A mixed question should also be found where there is an
elevated risk that the constitutional right at issue will not be properly protected
in state courts because of bias or some other factor.' n
2. Exceptions to the Presumption of Correctness of
State Findings of Fact
Several important exceptions to the presumption of correctness were also
established by Congress.' 3 Most of the exceptions entail inadequacies in the
factfmding procedures employed in the state court. The exceptions are:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
198. Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
199. See, e.g., Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412 (1985) (juror impartiality is a question of fact); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025
(1984); Massio v. Fulford, 469 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam) (competency to stand trial is a
question of fact); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
224 (1995).
200. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1030; see also Miller, 474 U.S. at 113 (voluntariness of a confession
is a legal issue); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698 (effectiveness of counsel is a legal issue).
201. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 465.
202. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1030.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(8) (1988).
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(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depriva-
tion of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to
represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent
to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter,
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record
as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record.0 4
The absence of a full and fair hearing is the most common basis for challeng-
ing factfmding made by a state court. Habeas counsel should review section
2254(d) carefully in formulating arguments to prevent a federal judge from
deferring to fact determinations made by a state court."5
Unless a petitioner can show that the presumption of correctness should
not apply to state court factf'mding, a petitioner bears the burden of establish-
ing "by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the [s]tate court
was erroneous."206
B. Evidentiary Hearings
1. When Federal Hearings Are Mandatory
A petitioner may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal
court.2 "l In moving for a federal evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must
allege facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief."8 Furthermore,
204. Id.
205. Habeas counsel should challenge the court's determinations as being neither full nor fair
where the state postconviction court adopted wholesale the factual conclusions proposed by the
attorney general. See Blackmon v. Scott, 22 F.3d 560, 563-64 (5th Cir.) (finding that in failing
to raise the issue below, the petitioner waived the right to object to finding of fact drafted by
assistant district attorney and submitted ex parte), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
207. The hearing may be conducted by a federal magistrate. HABEAS RULES, supra note 22,
Rule 8(b), 10.
208. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 451 (1971); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307
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a de novo evidentiary hearing must be held "in every case in which the state
court has not after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts."209
In Townsend, the Court catalogued six circumstances in which a federal
court must hold a hearing due to various deficiencies in the state court
factfinding processes:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record
as a whole;
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing;
(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the applicant a full and fair fact hearing.210
Also, if the state conducted a full and fair hearing but did not make findings
of fact, the petitioner is entitled to a de novo federal hearing.
21'
In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes 12 a five to four majority overruled a
narrow portion of Townsend. Under Keeney, a petitioner is not entitled to a
federal evidentiary hearing based on Townsend's fifth factor-that "material
facts were not adequately developed in the state court hearing"-unless the
petitioner can meet the cause and prejudice standard excusing petitioner's
failure to develop the necessary facts in state court.13 Attorney error
accounted for material facts not being developed in Keeney. The Court found
that the error did not constitute cause for failing to develop the facts in the
state courts.21 4 In the Court's view, comity and federalism require adoption
of the principle that a petitioner should be encouraged to fully develop facts
in the state courts, so that state courts can correct errors in the first in-
(1963), overruledon other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Washington
v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1476 (4th Cir. 1991).
209. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)
("[Petitioner is] entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination
of his federal claim, without being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim reached
in the state proceedings.").
210. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. The overlap between the factors listed in Townsend and the
factors related to the presumption of correctness in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is close, but not exact.
For a more detailed treatment of this area, see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 9.
211. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313; see Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 1190, 1192 (4th Cir. 1990).
212. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
213. Id. at 12.
214. Id. at 10 n.5.
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stance.215 Keeney was remanded to the federal district court to afford the
petitioner an opportunity to show cause and prejudice. 216  Because Keeney
applies to the fifth Townsend circumstance only, the other Townsend grounds
entitling a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing are not affected by the
ruling.2 17 Thus, if the facts were not resolved in the state court hearing,
218
if the hearing was not full and fair,219 if the facts as found are not supported
by the record, 2 if there is newly discovered evidence,"' or if there is any
other reason justifying a hearing,' then the federal district court still must
conduct an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding.
2. Discretionary Hearings
Even if none of Townsend's six circumstances exists, the district judge
always has the discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing.m However, state
court factfindings made after a full hearing will be presumed correct unless
one of the eight criteria set forth in section 2254(d) is applicable. Although
section 2254(d) establishes the presumption of correctness, in practice no such
presumption will be applied if a hearing is mandatory under Townsend because
of the overlap between the Townsend criteria and the statutory criteria. Even
if section 2254(d) requires state factfmdings to be presumed correct, a
petitioner still may request an evidentiary hearing "to establish by convincing
evidence that the factual determination by the [s]tate court was errone-
ous. "224
215. Id. at 9; see also Stewart v. Nix, 31 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because "newly-alleged facts" supporting
diminished capacity defense could have been presented in state court).
216. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 1.
217. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1362 n.14 (10th Cir. 1994).
218. See, e.g., Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 321-22 (3d Cir. 1994); Lesko v. Lehman, 925
F.2d 1527, 1540 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 898 (1991).
219. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Dumond v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d
419, 421 (8th Cir. 1989); Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'don other
grounds sub nom. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985).
220. See Blackmon v. Scott, 22 F.3d 560, 566 & n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 671
(1994); Bums v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1986).
221. See Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994).
222. See Noland v. Dixon, 831 F. Supp. 490, 508 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
223. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963); see also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 23 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Dlistrict courts ... still possess the discretion,
which has not been removed by today's opinion, to hold hearings even where they are not
mandatory.").
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see In re Wainwright, 678 F.2d 951 (11th Cir. 1982).
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3. Hearings on Procedural Defenses
The State's assertion of procedural defenses may trigger the need for
additional factfinding. For example, a petitioner may be able to show cause
for a procedural default only if he can establish through an evidentiary hearing
that the State had withheld critical evidence2" or that counsel's ineffec-
tiveness prevented him from raising a meritorious claim. A petitioner is
entitled to a hearing in federal court if the petitioner has not had a full and fair
hearing in state court on these issues. 6
C. Harmless Error
Even if a federal court finds that the state court committed a constitutional
error, a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to relief if the error was
harmless. 7  In Brecht v. Abrahamsone8 the Court held that an error is
not harmless if it "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict.' "" Prior to Brecht, an error was harmless
only if there was no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the
verdict.' 0  The Court noted the distinctions between direct review and
habeas corpus in order to rationalize its use of different harmless error
standards: "Direct review is the principal avenue for challenging a conviction"
whereas the "role of federal habeas proceedings . . . is secondary and
225. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
226. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Porter v. Singleton, 49 F.3d 1483 (11th
Cir. 1995); Watson v. New Mexico, 45 F.3d 385 (10th Cir. 1995); Jamison v. Lockhart, 975
F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir. 1992); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 1988);
Sockwell v. Maggio, 709 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1983); McShanev. Estelle, 683 F.2d 867, 870
(5th Cir. 1982). At the hearing, petitioner must be allowed to demonstrate either cause and
prejudice, or that it would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice not to address the claims on
the merits. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
227. Of course, some errors can never be harmless. Structural defects such as trial before a
biased judge or the total deprivationof the right to counsel defy harmless error analysis. Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993)
(holding that a defective reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless); Abdullah v.
Groose, 44 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that forcing defendant to stand trial shackled
is a structural error); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634 n. 17 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that Batson
violations are not subject to harmless error analysis); Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections,
20 F.3d 1469, 1478-79 (9th Cir.) (finding that denial of the right to counsel of choice was
structural error), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 357 (1994).
228. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). For a more detailed discussion of Brecht, see John H. Blume
& Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson,
35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163 (1993).
229. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)).
230. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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limited.""3 The Court rejected the argument that the more stringent test of
Chapman is necessary to deter state courts from relaxing their guard. It deter-
mined that "the costs of applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas
outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, which would be derived from
its application on collateral review."232 The Court also stated that the costs
of reversing a state court conviction, where there was only a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome, was too high. 3
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, stated that the burden of
demonstrating that the error was harmless rests upon the prosecution. 34 He
also stated that the error must be evaluated in the context of the entire record
because a reviewing court must be sensitive to "all the ways that error can
infect the course of a trial."" The emphasis is not on how the error
affected the verdict. Accordingly, the court cannot ask only if the petitioner
would have been convicted absent the error. Rather, habeas courts must be
able to determine that "'the error did not influence the jury,'" and that "'the
judgment -was not substantially swayed by the error.'"26 Again, the issue
is not whether the decision was right, but "'what effect the error had or
reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision.'" 3 7 Justice
Stevens pointed out that the inquiry cannot be whether there was enough
evidence to support the result. Consequently, the Court has held that
when a federal habeas judge "is in grave doubt" about the harmfulness of the
trial error, "the petitioner must win."239
In some circumstances, a federal court may appropriately employ the
more demanding Chapman harmless error test. If, for example, the state court
did not find constitutional error and, thus, had no occasion to resort to the
Chapman test, the federal court may then examine the harmlessness using
Chapman.24 Even in Brecht, the Court noted that one federal court had
231. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719.
232. Id. at 1721.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 1724.
236. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)).
237. Id. at 1724 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764).
238. Id. at 1724 n.2.
239. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995).
240. Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1541 (8th Cir. 1994); see Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d
986, 991 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the Chapman test). But see Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d
1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying the Brecht test rather than Chapman); Smith v. Dixon,
14 F.3d 956, 976 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (applying Brecht rather than Chapman).
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already conducted the Chapman test to determine if there was a reasonable
probability that an error affected the outcome of the state trial.24
V. STAYS OF EXECUTION
A death-sentenced inmate may have to request a stay of execution in
federal court pending resolution of the writ of habeas corpus.242 An inmate
is entitled to a stay of execution even before filing the petition, guaranteeing
that the inmate will be appointed counsel and that counsel will have a
meaningful opportunity to investigate the case and prepare the petition.243
The leading Supreme Court case addressing stays of execution is Barefoot
v. Estelle.2' In essence, if a first federal habeas petition is involved, a stay
of execution should be issued if the petition raises any "nonfrivolous claims
of constitutional error. "245 The standard for a stay pending appeal is the
same standard used to determine whether to issue a certificate of probable
cause to appeal.246 If a court issues a certificate of probable cause, a
petitioner must be given an opportunity to address the merits. A petitioner is
then entitled to a stay.24 A petitioner should seek a stay pending appeal
from the district court before requesting it from the court of appeals.
Generally, an execution date will not be set in a South Carolina case until the
inmate has completed one round of state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus proceedings.
In a second or successive petition, the relevant standard for a stay of
execution is more stringent: whether there are "substantial grounds upon which
relief might be granted.""24
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in habeas doctrine have created numerous procedural
traps for inmates seeking to vindicate their most fundamental rights. Despite
the increasingly hostile judicial and political attitudes toward prisoners, habeas
corpus remains available to those punished in violation of the federal constitu-
tion. This overview of the procedural issues in federal habeas corpus and its
241. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
243. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
244. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
245. Id. at 888; see also Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1980) (granting a stay of
execution where pending proceedings were not an attempt to relitigate prior issues).
246. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892-93. For a discussion of when a court will issue a certificate
of probable cause to appeal, see supra part II.B.8.a.
247. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893.
248. Id. at 895; Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 321 (1990) (per curiam).
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relationship with state postconviction proceedings is designed to assist South
Carolina inmates in effectively challenging their convictions and sentences.
The ultimate goal is to provide basic justice.
34
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